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Abstract—“Shilling” attacks or “profile injection” attacks have always major challenges in collaborative 
filtering recommender systems (CFRSs). Many efforts have been devoted to improve collaborative filtering 
techniques which can eliminate the “shilling” attacks. However, most of them focused on detecting push attack 
or nuke attack which is rated with the highest score or lowest score on the target items. Few pay attention to 
grey attack when a target item is rated with a lower or higher score than the average score, which shows a 
more hidden rating behavior than push or nuke attack. In this paper, we present a novel detection method to 
make recommender systems resistant to such attacks. To characterize grey ratings, we exploit rating deviation 
of item to discriminate between grey attack profiles and genuine profiles. In addition, we also employ novelty 
and popularity of item to construct rating series. Since it is difficult to discriminate between the rating series of 
attacker and genuine users, we incorporate into discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to amplify these differences 
based on the rating series of rating deviation, novelty and popularity, respectively. Finally, we respectively 
extract features from rating series of rating deviation-based, novelty-based and popularity-based by using 
amplitude domain analysis method and combine all clustered results as our detection results. We conduct a list 
of experiments on both the Book-Crossing and HetRec-2011 datasets in diverse attack models. Experimental 
results were included to validate the effectiveness of our approach in comparison with the benchmarked 
methods.  
Keywords—recommender system; grey attack; discrete wavelet transform 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Collaborative filtering recommender systems (CFRSs) have become a popular and effective tool for 
information retrieval especially when users facing information overload. CFRSs also have played an 
important role in many popular web services such as Netflix, Amazon and etc, which are designed to 
recommend items based on relevant information for the specific user [3], [5], [11], [14]. However, CFRSs 
are particularly vulnerable to “shilling” attacks or “profile injection” attacks in which an attacker signs up 
as a number of “puppet” users and rates fake scores in an attempt to promote or demote the 
recommendations of specific items by using knowledge of the recommender algorithms [20], [21]. In such 
attacks, the attackers deliberately insert attack profiles into genuine profiles to change the prediction results 
which would reduce the trustworthiness of recommendation. The attack profiles indicate the attacker’s 
intention that he wishes a particular item can be rated highest score (called push attack) or lowest score 
(called nuke attack) [4], [6], [7], [9], [10], [16], [18], [19]. In addition, to avoid being detected easily, the 
attackers may rate a higher score or lower score on the target items, which generates relatively hidden 
attack intents in comparison with push attacks or nuke attacks [24], we also call them grey attacks. Of 
course, they belong to the “shilling” attacks. Therefore, constructing an effective system to defend the 
attackers and remove them from the CFRSs is crucial.  
Although existing work in this area have focused on detecting and preventing the “shilling” attacks or 
“profile injection” attacks, it has not reached an fully acceptable level of detection performance. In the 
literature, supervised and semi-supervised methods have focused on the feature extraction of user profiles 
and train a classifier to perform classification. Burke et al. [3] proposed and studied several attributes 
derived from user profiles for their utility in attack detection. They employed kNN as their classification 
approach. However, it was unsuccessful when detecting attacks with small filler size 
1
 and also suffered 
from low classifier precision. Then, Williams et al. [15], [24], [28] used several trained classifiers to detect 
shilling attacks based on extracted features of user profiles. However, they suffered from low accuracy and 
many genuine profiles are misclassified as attack profiles. Although, [24] used the higher/lower ratings 
instead of the maximum/minimum ratings to the target item, discussion of detecting such attacks was 
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limited. Moreover, the detection performance was limited when filler size is small. Mobasher et al. [29] 
employed signatures of attack profiles and were moderately accurate. But, the method suffered from  low 
accuracy in detecting shilling attack. They just focused on individual users and mostly ignored the 
combined effect of such attackers. In addition, the detection performance was limited when the attack 
profiles are obfuscated. Wu et al. [30] proposed a semi-supervised hybrid detection method to detect 
shilling attacks, which combines the naïve Bayesian classifiers and augmented expectation maximization 
base on several selected metrics. But, their technique suffered from low F-measure [33] when filler size is 
small. Zhang et al. [31] proposed an ensemble approach to improve the precision of detection by using 
meta-learning technique. Their proposed method performs better detection performance than the bench 
marked methods, but, it suffered from low precision when attack size 
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 is small. He et al. [32] employed 
rough set theory to detect shilling attacks though taking features of user profiles as the condition attributes 
of the decision table. However, their method also suffered from low precision. F. Zhang et al. [17] 
proposed an online method to detect profile injection attacks based on HHT and SMV. Although their 
experimental results reported good performance, it was not reached an acceptable precision when the filler 
size is larger.  
In addition, unsupervised methods have been proposed for detecting “shilling” attacks, which require 
certain prior knowledge rather than training samples. To name a few, Bryan et al. [5] proposed a detection 
method (UnRAP) to identify the attack profiles by introducing the variance adjusted mean square residue. 
The detection method performs good results on average and random attacks, but it reported poor detection 
results on bandwagon attack when filler size is small. Lee et al. [25] proposed a hybrid detection method 
which combines multidimensional scaling approach and clustering-based method to discriminate attackers. 
The method was effective in detecting average and random and bandwagon attacks, but it was unsuccessful 
when detecting attacks with small filler size. Mehta et al. [26] exploited similarity structure in attack 
profiles to separate them from normal genuine profiles by using unsupervised dimensionality reduction. 
They also proposed two detection methods, PCA-based and PLSA. The algorithm was effective in 
detecting various attack models, it needs to know the number of attack profiles to be injected in advance. 
However, their detection performance became worse when the attack profiles are obscured. Zhou et al. [1] 
proposed a detection technique for identifying group attack profiles, called DeR-TIA, which combines an 
improved metric based on Degree of Similarity with Top Neighbors (DegSim) and Rating Deviation from 
Mean Agreement (RDMA). But, it performed poor detection performance when filler size is small. Zhang 
et al. [19] proposed a spectral clustering method to make recommender systems resistant to the shilling 
attacks in the case that the attack profiles are highly correlated with each other. Their experimental results 
reported good performance in random, average and bandwagon attacks. However, it also performed poor 
precision and recall in AOP attack when attack size is small.  
To sum up, we can briefly summarize that it is difficult to improve detection performance for detecting 
such attacks when filler size or attack size is small. Moreover, few pay attention to the grey attack 
detection. As an attacker demotes (nuke attack) the target items by rating lowest score or promotes (push 
attack) the target items by rating highest score, he also can demote or promote the target items by rating 
lower or higher scores. In fact, the rating behavior of an attacker is very similar to the behavior of a 
genuine user if the rating of target item is close to the actual rating. For a nuke attack is simply shifting the 
rating given to the target item from the minimum rating to a rating one step higher, for the push attack, and 
vice versa [24]. Any profile that includes these ratings is likely to be less suspect. Although a minor change, 
this has a key effect. Thus, a challenging detection method should not only perform well when attack size 
or filler size is small, but also effectively defend the grey attacks.  
In this paper, we propose an unsupervised attack detection method to make recommender systems 
resistant to such attacks, which combines discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and EM-based (Expectation-
maximization based) clustering method. Since the attackers mimic some rating details of genuine users in 
shilling attacks, the rating behavior between attackers and genuine users will become more similar, 
especially for the grey attacks. Although existing features extracted from user profiles can characterize the 
shilling attacks to some extent, it’s difficult to fully discriminate between attack profiles and genuine 
profiles. Moreover, the above challenges are also significant in grey attacks. Our basic assumption is that 
we can use DWT to amplify the differences between attack profiles and genuine profiles. In addition, to 
characterize the features of grey ratings, we use rating deviation of item to  address this crucial problem. 
To construct input series for DWT, we create a list of transformed rating series to address this problem, 
which exploits the novelty, popularity and rating deviation of item for each user profiles, respectively. 
Moreover, we employ the empirical model decomposition (EMD) method to extract intrinsic mode 
functions (IMFs) from the rating series [17]. These can be seen that there are some but not obvious 
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difference between the attack profiles and genuine profiles (as shown in Figures 4-6). To amplify the 
difference, we further use DWT to transform these series. In essence, a rating series is a non-stationary 
random series. Therefore, it is very suitable to be processed by DWT which performs well for non-
stationary data [17]. After DWT, the differences between attack profiles and genuine profiles become more 
obvious (as shown in Figures 7-9). Based on the output series of DWT, we extract a list of effective 
features by using amplitude domain analysis method. And then exploiting EM clustering method to 
discriminate jointly attackers and genuine users based on the extracted features. In addition, the 
effectiveness of our proposed approach is validated and benchmark methods are briefly discussed. 
Experimental results show that our approach performs well for detecting the grey attacks in comparison 
with the benchmarked methods.  
The main purposes and major contributions of our paper are summarized as follows:  
 To characterize the grey ratings, we use rating deviation of item to discriminate between grey 
attack profiles and genuine profiles.  
 We investigate the grey attacks in collaborative recommender systems and conduct a series of grey 
attack experiments.  
 To extract DWT-based (based on discrete wavelet transform) features, we construct rating 
deviation-based, popularity-based and novelty-based rating series for each user profile, respectively.  
 Based on the outputs of DWT for each rating series, we extract 15 features by using amplitude 
domain analysis method.  
 We conduct a list of experiments on both the Book-Crossing and HetRec-2011 datasets and 
compare the performance of our proposed method with two benchmarked methods (HHT-SVM 
and DeR-TIA).  
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: Section 2 describes the attack model and 
introduces the theory of discrete wavelet transform. Our proposed detection method is introduced in 
Section 3. Experimental results and analysis are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, we conclude 
the paper with a brief summary and directions for future work.  
2. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we firstly describe the attack profiles and attack models. In addition, we introduce the 
theory of discrete wavelet transform to facilitate discussions later.  
2.1. Attack profiles and attack models 
In the literature, “shilling” attacks are classified into two ways: nuke attack and push attack [3]. In order 
to nuke or push a target item, the attacker should be clearly known the form of an attack profile. The 
general form of an attack profile is shown in Table 1. The details of the four sets of items are described as 
follows: 
  : The set of selected items with specified rating by the function     
   [13];  
  : A set of filler items, received items with randomly chosen by the function     
  ;  
  : A set of items with no ratings;  
  : A set of target items with singleton or multiple items, called single-target attack or multiple-targets 
attack. The rating is     
  , generally rated the maximum or minimum value in the entire profiles.  
In this paper, we utilize 8 attack models to generate attack profiles. The involved attack profiles and 
corresponding explanations are listed in Table 2. The details of these attack models in our experiments are 
described as follows: 
1) AOP attack: A simple and effective strategy to obfuscate the Average attack is to choose filler items 
with equal probability from the top x% of most popular items rather than from the entire collection of items 
[22]. 
TABLE I.  GENERAL FORM OF ATTACK PROFILES. 
            
  
  …   
    
  …   
    
  …   
    
  …   
  
    
   …     
       
   …     
       
   …     
   null … null 
TABLE II.  ATTACK SCHEMES. 
Attack Model 
      
   
   
(push/nuke/grey) 
Items Rating Items Rating 
AOP null 
x-% popular items, ratings set with 
normal dist around item mean.  
null     /           
Random null randomly chosen system mean null     /    /      
Average null randomly chosen item mean null     /    /      
Bandwago (average) popular items     /     randomly chosen item mean null     /    /      
Bandwagon (random) popular items     /     randomly chosen system mean null     /    /      
Segment segmented items     /     randomly chosen     /     null     /    /      
Reverse Bandwagon unpopular items     /     randomly chosen system mean null     /    /      
Love/Hate null null randomly chosen     /     null     /    /      
2) Random attack:                    
   [13]; 
3) Average attack:                       
   [13]; 
4) Bandwagon (average):    contains a set of popular items. And then, we use these items as   ,      
                 (push/nuke/grey) and              
   [13]; 
5) Bandwagon (random):    contains a set of popular items,                       and           
   
(nuke/grey) [13]; 
6) Segment attack:    contains a set of segmented items,                       and      
                (push/nuke/grey) [8]; 
7) Reverse Bandwagon attack:    contains a set of unpopular items,                      
(push/nuke/grey) and              [9]; 
8) Love/Hate attack:      and                 (nuke/grey) [9]. 
2.2. Discrete wavelet transform 
Discrete wavelet transform (DWT) has been recognized as a natural wavelet transform for discrete time 
signals. Both time and scale parameters are discrete. For a discrete-time sequence         , DWT is 
defined by discrete-time multi-resolution decomposition which could be computed by Mallat pyramidal 
decomposition algorithm (as shown in Equations (1)-(3)) [23]. However, since half the frequencies of the 
signal have now been removed, half the samples can be discarded according to Nyquist’s rule. The filter 
outputs are then sub-sampled by 2 (Mallat's and the common notation is the opposite, g- high pass and h- 
low pass):  
  
                                                                                             (1) 
  
            
   
                                                    (2) 
  
            
   
                                                    (3) 
where   and   are impulse responses of high-pass filter   and low-pass filter  , respectively.    
   and 
   
   are scale sequence and wavelet sequence of     scale.   is the maximum possible scale of the discrete 
signal     . The signal is also decomposed simultaneously using a high-pass filter. The outputs give the 
detail coefficients (from the high-pass filter) and approximation coefficients (from the low-pass) as shown 
in Figure 1. It is important that the two filters are related to each other and they are known as a quadrature 
mirror filter.  
DWT of a signal is calculated by passing it through a series of filters. The decomposition is repeated to 
further increase the frequency resolution and the approximation coefficients decomposed with high and 
low pass filters and then down-sampled (see Figure 2). This is represented as a binary tree with nodes 
representing a sub-space with different time-frequency localization. And the tree is known as a filter bank.  
 
Figure 1. Block diagram of filter analysis.  
 Figure 2. K (k greater than or equal to 1) levels of filter bank.  
 
Figure 3. The framework of our proposed method which consists of two stages: the stage of feature extraction and the stage of 
detection.  
3. OUR PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this section, we firstly introduce the framework of our proposed approach. And then we give several 
definitions of rating series used in this paper. Finally, we briefly describe our detection method.  
3.1. The framework 
As shown in Figure 3, our proposed algorithm consists of two stages: the stage of feature extraction and 
the stage of detection. At the stage of feature extraction, the feature is extracted one by one from user 
profiles by using the proposed feature extraction method (see subsection 3.2). Inspired from previous 
studies (Zhang et al. [17]), we incorporate into two concepts: Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) and 
Intrinsic Mode function (IMF). EMD is an adaptive and highly efficient decomposition method and is also 
a necessary step to reduce any given data into a collection of intrinsic mode functions (IMF) where 
the DWT analysis can be applied. As we all know, DWT is a method for analyzing non-stationary data, 
since the rating series are non-stationary data. The IMF is defined as a function that satisfies the following 
requirements:  
1) In the whole data set 
The number of extreme and zero-crossings must either be equal or differ at most by one;  
2) At any point 
The mean value of the envelope defined by the local maxima and the envelope defined by the 
local minima is zero.  
With this method, rating series can be decomposed into a finite signal and regard the signal as the input 
of discrete wavelet transform [17], [27]. In our proposed approach, we decompose respectively each user 
profiles into novelty-based, popularity-based and rating deviation-based rating series as the input signals. 
And then, the input signals are passed through the series of filters (including low-pass and high-pass filter, 
as shown in Figure 3.) to generate corresponding output signals. In the process of DWT, we perform one 
level transformation to get the output signals. Then, by using amplitude domain analysis method to extract 
features from the output signal. At the stage of detection, based on the extracted features, we respectively 
use EM method to cluster two groups. Finally, combing the three parts of clustering results to return our 
detection result.  
3.2. Feature extraction 
Previous studies [17] have disclosed that using the novelty and popularity of items to construct rating 
series for user profiles implies useful information. Inspired from this research, we investigate using rating 
deviation of items to construct rating series in order to extract features from grey attack profiles. Novelty 
3
 
in recommendation is focusing on recommending the log-tail items (i.e., less popular items) which is 
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 The novelty of an item refers to the degree to which it is unusual with respect to the user’s normal tastes. 
generally considered to be particularly valuable to users. Popularity of items usually reflects the genuine 
users’ tastes or preferences in collaborative recommender system. By sorting the items according to their 
novelty, popularity and rating deviation, we can create respectively the rating deviation-based, novelty-
based and popularity-based rating series for the user profiles. Firstly, two definitions of the rating deviation 
are described in the following:  
Definition 1 (Rating Deviation of Items, RDoI).  
The       (rating deviation of item    is defined as follows: 
       
                       
                        
 ,                                                              (4) 
where     denotes the rating of user   on item  .    is the mean rating of item   in the system.       
denotes item   is rated by user  ,       denotes item   is not rated by user  .    denotes the set of 
genuine users in dataset.  
Definition 2 (Rating Deviation-based Rating Series, RDBRS).  
Let       denotes the rating deviation of item  . Sort all items in set   (a set of the entire items in the 
recommender system.) according to       in descending order and let             denotes the order of 
items after sorting, where     denotes total number of items in the recommender system. 
The           4  is defined as follows: 
           
                                              
                                              
                                                                                          
                      (5) 
where zero value is used to meet the requirements of extreme for DWT.        denotes item   is rated by 
user  .        denotes item   is not rated by user  .  
Novelty of Items, NoI 
The      novelty of item    is defined as follows: 
     
 
    
                                                                              (6) 
where        denotes the novelty of item   for user   [17].  
       
 
    
                                                                           (7) 
where    denotes the number of users who rate on item  .    denotes the set of genuine users in dataset. 
          (Jaccard coefficient) denotes the similarity between item   and item  , which can be calculated as 
follows:  
          
       
       
                                                           (8) 
where    is set of users that rated by item  ,    is the set of users that rated by item  . If both    and    
are empty, we define            . Clearly,              .  
Novelty-based Rating Series, NBRS 
Let      denotes the novelty of item   . Sort all items in set   according to      in descending order and 
let             denotes the order of items after sorting. The novelty-based rating series of 
user  ,         is defined as follows: 
          
                                           
                                           
                                                                                
                               (9) 
where zero value is used to meet the requirements of extreme for DWT [17].  
Popularity of Items, PoI 
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 The rating deviation-based rating series of user  . 
 
   (a) Genuine profile                                   (b) Average attack profile 
Figure 4. Rating Deviation-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile before DWT; (b) The signal of a average attack 
profile before DWT.  
 
(a) Genuine profile                                  (b) Average attack profile 
Figure 5. Popularity-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile before DWT; (b) The signal of a average attack profile 
before DWT.  
 
   (a) Genuine profile                                       (b) Average attack profile 
Figure 6. Novelty-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile before DWT; (b) The signal of a average attack profile 
before DWT.  
The popularity of item  ,     , is defined as the number of ratings given to item   by genuine users in data 
set [17].  
Popularity-based Rating Series, PBRS 
Let      denotes the popularity of item  . Sort all items in set   according to      in descending order and 
let             denotes the order of items after sorting. The popularity-based rating series of 
user  ,         , is defined as follows: 
          
                                            
                                            
                                                                              
                             (10) 
where zero value is used to meet the requirements of extreme for DWT [17].  
To show the difference between genuine and attack profiles in rating series, we give examples of the 
novelty-based, popularity-based and rating deviation-based rating series in Figures 4-6. These rating series 
are constructed by the genuine profiles and the average attack profiles (take average attack for example). 
The genuine profiles are selected from the Book-Crossing dataset. As shown in Figures 4-6, there are very 
little difference between the genuine and average attack profiles in rating series. We can observe that the 
RDBRS for the genuine profile barely changed from starting position to ending position in compared to the 
RDBRS of the average attack profile decreased gradually for the rating deviation-based rating series. For 
the popularity-based rating series, the PBRS for the genuine profile barely changed with the item increased 
while the PBRS of the average attack profile decreased gradually. And for the novelty-based rating series, 
the NBRS for genuine profile also almost remain unchanged with the item increased, while the NBRS of 
the average attack profile show characteristics of more concentrated. As mentioned above, it is difficult to 
discriminate between genuine profiles and attack profiles regardless of using Rating Deviation-based, 
Popularity-based and Novelty-based rating series. To amplify the difference between genuine profiles and 
attack profiles, we use DWT to transform the rating series in order to extract features from output signal by 
using amplitude domain analysis method.  
After K (k greater than or equal to 1) level discrete wavelet transform (as shown in Figure 2), we can get 
the local properties, which passes a series low-pass filters to obtain an approximation coefficients. As 
shown in Figures 7-9, we can observe that there is a more significant difference between genuine profiles 
and average attack profiles on rating series than before using DWT. In Figure 7, the strength of oscillations 
of genuine profiles show characteristics of more concentrated with the item increased while the strength of 
oscillations of average attack profile decreased gradually from starting position to ending position. For the 
popularity-based rating series, the same observations are also clear in Figure 8. And for the novelty-based 
rating series, we can observe that there is a little difference between the genuine profiles and average attack 
profiles, although they show characteristics of more concentrated similarly as illustrated in Figure 9.  
Let         ,         and         denotes the feature vector of user   on the rating deviation-
based, novelty-based and popularity-based after DWT, respectively. The proposed feature extraction 
algorithm is described in algorithm 1. In algorithm 1, from step 1 to step 3 create the rating deviation-based, 
novelty-based and popularity-based rating series for user   respectively. Step 4 is the process of DWT. 
Step 5 extract features from approximation parts of rating deviation, popularity and novelty rating series, 
termed       ,      and      by using amplitude domain analysis method. The last step generates a 
feature space for the stage of detection.  
Algorithm 1: Feature extraction algorithm for user profiles 
Input: Rating Matrix; 
Output:         ,         and        ; 
Step 1: Create rating series           of   by using rating matrix and Equations (4)-(5); 
Step 2: Create rating series          of   by using rating matrix and Equations (6)-(9); 
Step 3: Create rating series          of   by using rating matrix and Equation (10); 
Step 4: Generate approximation parts   and detail parts   by exploiting Mallat (discrete wavelet transform) 
algorithm on the rating series of          ,          and          by using Equations (1)-(3), respectively; 
Step 5: Take the K level approximation parts      ,      and      from Step 4’s output, respectively. And 
extract features from the approximation parts by using amplitude domain analysis method on      ,      and 
     respectively; 
Step 6: Generate and return the feature space         ,         and         respectively. 
 
   (a) Genuine profile   (b) Average attack profile 
Figure 7. The first low-pass output of the rating deviation-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile after DWT; (b) The 
signal of a average attack profile after DWT.  
 
(a) Genuine profile   (b) Average attack profile 
Figure 8. The first low-pass output of the popularity-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile after DWT; (b) The 
signal of a average attack profile after DWT.  
 
(a) Genuine profiles   (b) Average attack profiles 
Figure 9. The first low-pass output of the novelty-based rating series. (a) The signal of a genuine profile after DWT; (b) The signal 
of a average attack profile after DWT.  
  
(a)                                       (b) 
Figure 10. The power feature and the energy feature in different K levels output of discrete wavelet transforms for a genuine user 
and an attacker. (a) Power features; (b) Energy features.  
TABLE III.  THE FEATURES OF THE SIGNAL AMPLITUDE DOMAIN AND THEIR DESCRIPTION. 
Features Equations Descriptions 
Minimum value              The minimum value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Maximum value              The maximum value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Mean value            The average value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Peak value                 The maximum of the absolute value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Root mean square value       
 
 
   
 
 
   
 The root mean square value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Root mean square amplitude value     
 
 
      
 
   
 
 
 Represent the energy size of the signal. 
Absolute mean      
 
 
     
 
   
 Absolute mean value of the amplitude of the signal. 
Variance   
      
      Represent the degree of dispersion of the signal. 
Skewness   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
Represent the asymmetry of amplitude probability density 
function on the vertical axis. 
Kurtosis   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 Represent the steep degree of the signal curve. 
Shape factor              
A shape factor refers to a value that is affected by an 
object's shape but is independent of its dimensions 
Crest factor              
Crest factor is a measure of a waveform, showing the ratio of peak 
values to the average value. 
Impulse factor              Non-dimensional parameter in amplitude domain. 
Clearance factor             Non-dimensional parameter in amplitude domain. 
Kurtosis value          
  Non-dimensional parameter in amplitude domain. 
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For different types of signal, there are different analysis methods such as time domain analysis, 
frequency domain analysis and amplitude domain analysis. As shown in Figure 10, we can observe that 
these are no significant difference between genuine user and attacker with the K (the K level output of 
DWT) increased, regardless of using the power features or energy features. In this paper, we use amplitude 
domain analysis to extract features from signals. The details of signal features in amplitude domain are 
showed in Table 3. We have 15 features to characterize the signal which extracts from the K level (we set 
K equal to 1 in our work) output of DWT.  
3.3. Detection algorithm 
In order to get better detection performance as far as possible, we combine the rating deviation-based, 
novelty-based and popularity-based methods to distinguish between genuine profiles and attack profiles. 
And then, we use EM as the data mining algorithm to detect grey attacks. Let   denotes the set of detection 
result. The proposed method for detecting grey attacks is described in algorithm 2. In algorithm 2, from 
step 1 to 3 perform EM algorithm on feature vector         ,         and        , respectively. Step 
4 obtains the set of attackers decided by using the smaller cluster, since the number of attackers less than 
the number of genuine users in the recommender system. In step 5, we exploit the intersection of the 
set     ,     and    , and then the detection result  was generated.  
Algorithm 2: Detection algorithm 
Input: The set of users’ feature space         ,         and 
       ; The number of clusters  ; 
Output: The detected result  ; 
Step 1: {           }  EM(        ); 
Step 2: {         }  EM(       ); 
Step 3: {         }  EM(       ); 
Step 4:                        ,                    , 
                   ; 
Step 5:                     ; 
Return . 
4. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we firstly show the experimental data and settings on two real-world datasets. Then, we 
describe the evaluation metrics such as detection rate and false alarm rate for the comparison with our 
proposed algorithm and two benchmark methods in different attack models. Secondly, we conduct a list of 
grey attacks experiments to compare the prediction shift in different grey ratings. Finally, we discuss the 
experimental results.  
4.1. Experimental data and settings 
In our experiments, we use both the Book-Crossing
5
 and HetRec-2011
6
 datasets. Book-Crossing 
contains 278,858 users providing 1,149,780 ratings (explicit/implicit) about 271,379 books and each rater 
had to rate at least 1 books. All ratings are in the form of integral values between minimum value 1 and 
maximum value 10. The minimum score means the rater dislikes the book, while the maximum score 
means the rater enjoyed the book. For HetRec-2011 dataset, it consists of 105,000 integer ratings (from 1-
10) of 10197 movies from 2113 users. Similarly, the minimum score means the rater dislikes the movie, 
while the maximum score means the rater enjoyed the movie. In our experiments, we randomly select 800 
genuine profiles from the two datasets as the samples of genuine profiles, respectively.  
The attack profiles indicate the attackers intention that he wishes a particular item can be rated the 
highest or lowest, higher or lower rating. In this paper, we just detect the nuke attacks and their grey 
attacks, push attacks can be detected in the analogous manner. For each attack model (as shown in Table 2), 
we respectively generate nuke and grey attack profiles according to the corresponding attack models with 
diverse attack sizes {3%, 7%, 12%, 17%, 22%, 27%, 32%, 37%, 42%, 47%} and filler sizes {1%, 1.7%, 
2.5%, 5%, 6.7%, 8%, 10%}. In addition, to ensure the rationality of the results, the target item is randomly 
selected for these attack profiles. Especially in Table 2, the       is the grey rating on target items rated by 
lower scores such as 1, 3, 5 and 7. Moreover, for bandwagon (random and average) attacks, we select 
randomly 10 items from popular items as the selected items which are rated by more than 200 users in the 
sampled dataset. For segment attack, we select 5 top popular items as the segmented items which are rated 
                                                          
5
 http://www.informatik.uni-freiburg.de/~cziegler/BX/ 
6
 http://grouplens.org/datasets/hetrec-2011/ 
with the highest number of users. And for reverse bandwagon attack, we randomly choose 10 items as the 
selected items which are rated by one user in the sampled dataset.  
To create a training set for the benchmarked method HHT-SVM, we generate attack profiles by using 8 
attack models with different filler sizes {1%, 1.7%, 2.5%, 5%, 6.7%, 8%, 10%}, respectively. Besides, to 
balance the proportion between genuine profiles and attack profiles in the training set, we construct 15 
attack profiles for each of the aforementioned attack models corresponding to the filler sizes. Thus, the 
training dataset consists of 800 genuine profiles and 840 attacker profiles. For test sets, we randomly select 
800 genuine profiles from the remaining 278,058 genuine profiles in the Book-Crossing dataset. 
Furthermore, we generate respectively attack profiles by exploiting 8 attack models with diverse attack 
sizes {3%, 7%, 12%, 17%, 22%, 27%, 32%, 37%, 42%, 47%} and filler sizes {1%, 1.7%, 2.5%, 5%, 6.7%, 
8%, 10%}. And then, the generated attack profiles are respectively inserted into the sampled genuine 
profiles to construct our test datasets. Therefore, we have 560 (8*10*7) test datasets including 8 attack 
models, 10 different attack sizes and 7 different filler sizes. For the HetRec-2011 dataset, we generate 
attack profiles in the same way. Notice that, these process is repeated 10 times and the average value of 
detection results are reported for the experiments. All numerical studies are implemented using MATLAB 
R2012a on a personal computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz CPU, 16G memory and 
Microsoft windows 7 operating system.  
To measure detection performance of the proposed methods, we use detection rate and false alarm rate 
in our experiments.  
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                                                                 (12) 
where D is the set of the detected user profiles,   is the set of attacker profiles, and   is the set of genuine 
user profiles [11].  
4.2. The prediction shift in grey attacks 
To validate the effectiveness of grey attacks in our work, we conduct a list of  experiments in average 
attack (average attack is taken for example) with diverse attack sizes and filler sizes. The target items rated 
with grey ratings including 3 and 5 score (these two grey ratings are taken for examples). To measure the 
deviation between the prediction rating and the actual rating, we use Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and 
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) to evaluate the recommendation precision of algorithm.  
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                                                                 (14) 
where      denotes the actual rating user   gave to item  ,       denotes the rating user   gave to item   
as predicted by a method, and   denotes the number of total ratings in the test set [2], [12], [20].  
As shown in Figures 11 and 12,  one observation is that MAE and RMSE increased gradually with 
the filler size and attack size increasing when the grey rating on target items is 5 (in Figure 11) or 3 (in 
Figure 12). These results indicate that these grey attacks are effective to bias the recommendation 
results in comparison with no attack (both filler size and attack size are zero in the Figures).  
  
(a) MAE                                  (b) RMSE 
Figure 11. The comparison of MAE and RMSE in different attack sizes and filler sizes. The grey rating is 5. (a) MAE, single-target 
average attack. (b) RMSE, single-target average attack.  
  
(a) MAE                                  (b) RMSE 
Figure 12. The comparison of MAE and RMSE in different attack sizes and filler sizes. The grey rating is 3. (a) MAE, single-target 
average attack. (b) RMSE, single-target average attack. 
4.3. Experimental results and analysis 
To validate the detection performance of our proposed method, we employ two benchmarked methods 
including HHT-SVM [17] and DeR-TIA [1] to demonstrate the outperformance of our method. The details 
of these two benchmarked methods are described as follows:  
 HHT-SVM: An online detection method which combines Hilbert-Huang transforms (HHT) and 
support vector machine (SVM) and also can operate incrementally. We also use Libsvm 3.18 to 
generate the classifier. The RBF is used as the kernel function. We set gamma equal to 2 and cost 
equal to 32 according to the five-cross-validation method.  
 DeR-TIA: A technique for detecting attack profiles which uses an improved metric based on 
degree of similarity with Top Neighbors and rating deviation from mean agreement. We use k-
means method in the first phase and set the number of clusters equal to 2. In the second phase, we 
set the count threshold   equal to 6.  
Take bandwagon (random) attack for example, Figures 13 and 14 demonstrate how each algorithm 
performs under varying attack sizes and filler sizes, respectively. In the bandwagon (random) attack, a 
group isolated attackers always provide maximal or minimal or grey rating on a set of items when they 
are selected as the selected items or the filler items. As shown in Figures 13(a) and 14(a), the detection 
rate increased gradually and false alarm rate decreased gradually when the attack size increased and the 
filler size is fixed with 5% (in Figure 13 (a)) and filler size increased and attack size is 17% (in Figure 14 
(a)). In addition, we can observe that our method shows significantly better detection performance than 
HHT-SVM with the attack size increased. This might be attributed to the combination of novelty-based, 
popularity-based and rating deviation-based rating series adopted by out proposed algorithm. The rating  
  
(a)      (b) 
Figure 13. The comparison of detection rate and false alarm rate in different attack sizes. (a) Grey rating is 1, filler size is 5%, 
single-target bandwagon (random) attack; (b) Grey rating is 3, filler size is 5%, single-target bandwagon (random) attack.  
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(a)      (b) 
Figure 14. The comparison of detection rate and false alarm rate in different filler sizes. (a) Grey rating is 1, attack size is 17%, 
single-target bandwagon (random) attack; (b) Grey rating is 3, attack size is 17%, single-target bandwagon (random) attack.  
 
(a)      (b) 
Figure 15. The comparison of detection rate and false alarm rate with different grey ratings in single-target attack. (a) Filler size is 
5%, attack size varies in bandwagon (average) attack. (b) Attack size is 17%, filler size varies in bandwagon (average) attack. 
deviation-based strategy calculates a rating offset on a target item which can advantaged identify between 
the genuine profiles and attack profiles. The second observation is that DeR-TIA shows best performance 
among the three algorithms. With the attack size increasing, the detection rate almost keeps maximum 
100% and the false alarm rate almost keeps minimum 0, except for the early stages (attack size < 17%) as 
illustrated in Figure 13 (a). The same observations are also clear in Figure 14(a). However, for grey rating, 
as shown in Figures 13 (b) and 14 (b), we set a grey rating equal to 3 (integer rating from 1-10 in the 
datasets). Our method shows the best detection performance among the three methods, although the 
detection rate of our method shows lower than DeR-TIA in the early stage (attack size < 12%) as 
illustrated in Figure 13 (b). To compare with our proposed method and HHT-SVM, DeR-TIA shows 
higher false alarm rate than the others. Moreover, the detection rate of DeR-TIA almost remained 
unchanged with the attack size increased, and similar results can be observed in Figure 14 (b). The results 
might be attributed to grey rating. The first phase of DeR-TIA can filter out a part of genuine users by 
using similarity threshold, but it is difficult to capture the suspected profiles which rate grey ratings  in 
their second phase. They defend and remove the suspected users almost depend on the similarity 
threshold, so they perform lower detection performance. For our proposed method, we pay more attention 
to the details of the all ratings that rated by a user and explore the top-N items which has sorted by the 
rating deviation of item in order to characterize the grey ratings.  
To examine the detection performance of our method in bandwagon (random) attack with different 
grey ratings (take bandwagon (random) attack for example), we conduct a list of experiments with diverse 
attack sizes and filler sizes. As shown in Figure 15, we perform 4 different grey ratings including 1, 3, 5 
and 7 on the target items. One observation is that the detection rate gradually increased and false alarm 
rate gradually decreased with the attack size increasing (in Figure 15 (a)) or filler size increasing (in 
Figure 15 (b)). The other observation is that the detection performance gradually performs poor when the 
grey rating increased from 1 to 7, regardless of different attack sizes and filler sizes. The results may 
indicate that the grey ratings are close to average rating in the entire system with the grey rating on the 
target items increasing. The attackers rate an mean rating may show a rating behavior like genuine users, 
which is difficult to discriminate between attackers and genuine users and shows higher false alarm rate.  
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TABLE IV.  COMPARISON OF THE DETECTION PERFORMANCE OF OUR METHOD WITH TWO BENCHMARKED METHODS. 
Attack models Methods 
Rating 
1 3 5 7 
DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR 
AOP 
HHT-SVM 0.845 0.095 0.819 0.15 0.79 0.177 0.673 0.21 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.005 0.715 0.185 0.734 0.225 0.707 0.275 
Ours 0.911 0.0785 0.835 0.093 0.813 0.102 0.702 0.11 
Random 
HHT-SVM 0.819 0.12 0.765 0.15 0.7345 0.14 0.68 0.21 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.0025 0.735 0.175 0.727 0.195 0.731 0.265 
Ours 0.904 0.081 0.834 0.086 0.801 0.093 0.707 0.11 
Average 
HHT-SVM 0.873 0.1091 0.782 0.13 0.759 0.158 0.665 0.182 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.0025 0.763 0.165 0.750 0.205 0.752 0.195 
Ours 0.907 0.085 0.837 0.090 0.805 0.079 0.703 0.125 
Bandwagon (average) 
HHT-SVM 0.906 0.09 0.8279 0.14 0.7869 0.16 0.675 0.19 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.005 0.755 0.18 0.734 0.25 0.752 0.285 
Ours 0.935 0.0615 0.852 0.0713 0.823 0.0682 0.705 0.115 
Bandwagon (random) 
HHT-SVM 0.910 0.095 0.8179 0.13 0.8069 0.18 0.67 0.21 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.005 0.747 0.165 0.735 0.205 0.750 0.27 
Ours 0.934 0.055 0.868 0.075 0.83 0.069 0.718 0.115 
Segment 
HHT-SVM 0.897 0.0891 0.819 0.13 0.7869 0.167 0.667 0.193 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.0055 0.752 0.15 0.730 0.185 0.731 0.25 
Ours 0.915 0.075 0.846 0.08 0.815 0.086 0.70 0.11 
Reveres bandwagon 
HHT-SVM 0.895 0.087 0.8179 0.125 0.796 0.145 0.66 0.195 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.005 0.739 0.175 0.754 0.185 0.727 0.26 
Ours 0.933 0.065 0.868 0.075 0.815 0.0775 0.705 0.125 
Love/Hate 
HHT-SVM 0.849 0.105 0.807 0.135 0.7569 0.175 0.67 0.205 
DeR-TIA 1.0 0.0025 0.752 0.16 0.727 0.195 0.750 0.24 
Ours 0.917 0.075 0.845 0.065 0.81 0.0785 0.717 0.135 
  
(a)      (b) 
Figure 16. Detection rate and false alarm rate in different datasets under single-target segment attack. Grey rating is 3. (a) Filler size 
is 5% and attack size varies. (b) Attack size is 17% and filler size varies.  
To further illustrate the detection performance of our proposed method under different attack models 
with different grey ratings, we conduct a list of experiments in 8 attack models (such as AOP, random etc) 
for comparing the performance of our proposed method with HHT-SVM and DeR-TIA. We use 4 different 
ratings including 1, 3, 5 and 7 score) when filler size is 5% and attack size is 17%. As shown in Table 4, 
we can observe that the detection rate (DR) of our method reports higher than other two benchmarked 
methods when the grey rating increasing, except for the grey rating is 1. Similarly, the false alarm rate 
(FAR) of our method reports lower than others. In addition, the second observation is that the proposed 
method reports better detection performance under bandwagon (both random and average) and reverse 
bandwagon attacks in comparison with the other attack models, especially for grey ratings (such as 3, 5 and 
7 score). These results may indicate that we combine the rating deviation-based, novelty-based and 
popularity-based rating series in our method is useful to discriminate difference between grey attack 
profiles and genuine profiles. The rating deviation-based rating series may easily characterize the grey 
attacks in comparison with the other two methods.  
To evaluate the detection performance of our method in different datasets, we conduct a list of 
experiments on both the Book-Crossing and HetRec-2011 datasets with different attack sizes (in Figure 16 
(a)) and filler sizes (in Figure 16 (b)). Take the segment attack for example, we generate a series of grey 
attacks when the target items rated with grey rating 3. Figure 16 shows the detection performance of our 
proposed method in the two different datasets. We can observe that the detection rate increased gradually 
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and the false alarm rate decreased gradually with the attack size or filler size increasing in both the two 
datasets. Of course, our method is completely data-driven. The experimental results show good detection 
performance is not invariably mean effective in every datasets.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we highlighted the challenges faced by the grey attacks, and then we develop an 
unsupervised detection approach based on discrete wavelet transform by combing the rating deviation-
based, novelty-based and popularity-based rating series. Extensive experiments on the Book-Crossing 
dataset have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed approach. To compare with the benchmarked 
methods (HHT-SVM and DeR-TIA), our proposed method performs the best detection performance 
especially for detecting grey attacks. In addition, our method shows higher detection performance than 
HHT-SVM in the bandwagon (both random and average) and reverse bandwagon attacks. We also conduct 
a list of experiments on HetRec-2011 dataset to validate the detection performance of our method. Results 
show that our proposed method also is effective for detecting grey attacks. One of the limitations of our 
proposed method directly comes from the time consumption, which constructs the signals of rating series. 
However, it is important for our method to learn new types of attacks incrementally, since they are 
generated over time in the context of real collaborative recommender systems. In our future work, we 
intend to extend and improve grey attack detection in the following directions: 1) Considering more attack 
models such as Power users attack or Power items attack, etc.; 2) We will explore specific and simple 
method to detect grey attacks and develop better approach to construct the rating series. 3) Extracting more 
simpler and effective features to characterize grey attack profiles is still an open issue.  
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